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Airlines
In 1946 domestic airlines furnished about six billion passenger-
miles, compared with 59 billion for all railroad travel (other than
commutation), or 20 billion for parlor and sleeping car travel
only. In the same year American-flag international air carriers
supplied a further billion passenger-miles; American-flag inter-
national waterway traffic is not available for 1946, but amounted
to under a billion passenger-miles in 1939.' The industry has grown
rapidly in output and employment, and also in output per worker
(Table 37 and Charts 23 and 24). However, growth in produc-
tivity has been somewhat halting, particularly on the international
lines. Because domestic operations are on a larger scale than
international (see Appendix Table I-i) indexes for all airlines
do not differ greatly from those for domestic only. In domestic
operations (Chart 23) output grew steadily with no setback, rising
roughly tenfold each decade; the growth in employment was
somewhat less regular. International traffic (Chart 24) grew
about as fast as domestic, but underwent setbacks in 1931 and
1936, and failed to advance appreciably in 1938 and 1943; except
in 1942-43 employment expanded rather regularly.
This contrast suggests that international traffic is more subject
to chance disturbances, and perhaps also to business cycle influ-
ences, than domestic. It suggests also that —inpeacetime at least
—theworking force is somewhat less flexible, and less easily
adjusted to traffic needs, in the case of international than in the
case of domestic carriers. Perhaps this difference is connected with
the smaller share of office workers, and the greater relative impor-
Air traffic statistics quoted in this chapter cover scheduled or common-carrier
operations only, and neglect unscheduled or contract flights. The latter are of







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DOMESTIC AIRLINES: PASSENGER-MILES, SEAT-MILES,
AND PLANE-MILES PER WORKER,
1939:100 -
Passenger- Seat- Plane-
Revenue miles Passengermiles Revenuemiles
Passenger- per Seat- per Plane- per
miles Worker miles Worker miles Worker
1930 10.7 44 n.a. n.a. 39.4 163
1931 13.4 37 n.a. na. 52.0 144
1932 16,0 38 25.0 59 55.3 131
1933 21.9 51 30.8 72 59.4 139
1934 23.8 55 30.3 69 50J 115
1935 39.6 77 47.6 92 67.4 131
1936 55.0 83 56.5 85 77.5 117
1937 60.3 81 68.8 92 80.5 108
1938 70.3 83 78.3 93 82.7 98
1939 100.0 100 100.0 100 100.0 100
1940 154.1 114 149.5 110 132.8 98
1941 203 113 192.7 108 162.1 90
1942 208 89 161.6 69 134.3 57
1943 239 83 152.8 53 127.0 44
1944 319 103 201 65 167.3 54
1945 492 119 314 76 252 61
1946 871 143 622 102 374 • 62
n.a.; not available.
aAlldata from Civil Aeronautics Administration, Statistical Handbook of
Civil Aviation, 1948 issue. For passenger-miles and workers, see Appendix
Table I-i. Data cover scheduled (i.e., common carrier) airlines only.
tance of ground crews, among employees of international lines.2
But reclassifications of the employment data make it impossible
to substantiate this hypothesis.
The difference between domestic and international operations
is further illustrated by figures for annual passenger-miles per
employee —100thousand for domestic, 49 thousand for inter-
national, in 1946. The greater efficiency of the domestic carriers
was exhibited despite a shorter average journey487and 1,057
miles, respectively. We are apt to think that in transportation long
hauls lead to economies not attainable with short; but long trans-
ocean flights require much fuel, and fuel cuts pay load.
For instance, in 1940forinternational and domestic carriers, ratios of office
to all workers were 30 and 37 percent, and of all other ground employees to
all workers 62 and 45 percent, respectively. See Civil Aeronautics Administra-









The fairly rapid rise in output per worker on domestic airlines
can be analysed further. The indexes of output and output per
worker (Table 37 and Chart 23), in the case of these carriers,
include express, freight and mail ton-miles, as well as passenger-
miles. Indeed transportation of property accounted for about one-
third of total revenues in 1939, and its movement has a corre-
sponding influence upon the index. Passenger-miles per worker
(Table 38 and Chart 25) moves roughly in the same manner
as total output per worker. We have also computed seat-miles
per worker and plane-miles- per worker.3 It is evident that a large
Plane-miles need no explanation; seat-miles are obtained by multiplying














part of the rise in passenger-miles per'worker between 1932 and
1941 is associated with arise in seat-miles per worker. The average
seating capacity of planes rose from 7 in 1932 to 18 in 1941, and
the average journey increased from 268 to 360 miles. The remain-
irig rise in passenger-miles per worker we may associate with an
improved load factor (i.e., percentage of seats occupied).
On the other hand, between 1941 and 1946 seat-miles per
worker declined on balance, despite a further rise in average plane
capacity (to 25 seats) and a further lengthening of average jour-
ney (to 487 miles). The entire expansion in passenger-miles per
worker over this period must be imputed to a further improvement
in load factor (from 64 to 80 percent).
In fact, the rather steady decline in plane-miles per worker•
was no doubt partly due to the advent of larger planes which not
only require larger crews, but also more manhours for servicing.
The ratio of seat-miles per plane-mile is a function of the increasing
size of plane, just as the ratio of passenger-miles per seat-mile is
a measure of load factor. However, the extent to which passenger-
miles per worker can continue to rise without a corresponding rise
in seat-miles per worker is strictly limited by the impossibility of
overloading: average load factor reached 91 percent in 1944, was
80 percent in 1946 and declined to 67 percent in 1947. Presumably
the practically attainable load factor will be lower in peacetime
than in wartime. At any rate it is obvious that appreciable fur-
ther expansions in passenger-miles (and therefore in total output)
per worker must reflect improvements in seat-miles per worker.
Whether the latter ratio can be further increased through the
adoption of larger planes remains to be seen. Certainly in the past
the effects of increased seating capacity (i.e., larger planes) has
been largely swamped by the rather steady decline in plane-miles
per worker.
No doubt some of the decline in plane-miles per worker has
come about —assuggested —throughthe heavier air and ground
crew requirements of bigger planes. The remainder may have been
associated partly with the introduction of labor-consuming safety
devices, and partly with a reduction of hours of work. But the
statistics needed to pursue this inquiry are not available.-r
7
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